Mascots of Fear by Hornyik, Csongor Daniel
   MASCOTS OF FEAR 
 
   By 
   CSONGOR DANIEL HORNYIK 
   Bachelor of Arts in Psychology 
University of Kentucky 
Lexington, KY 
2004 
Master of Science in Social Psychology  
   Vrije Universiteit  
   Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
   2007 
 
 
   Submitted to the Faculty of the 
   Graduate College of the 
   Oklahoma State University 
   in partial fulfillment of 
   the requirements for 
   the Degree of 
   MASTER OF SCIENCE 
   December, 2010
ii 
 
   MASCOTS OF FEAR 
 
 
   Thesis  Approved: 
 
   Dr. Charles I. Abramson 
 Thesis Adviser 
   Dr. Jared P. Dempsey 
 
   Dr. John M. Chaney 
  
Dr. James W. Grice 
 
  Dr. Mark E. Payton 
   Dean of the Graduate College 
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
Furthermost, I would like to express how grateful I am to Dr Charles Abramson that he 
took me under his arm and together with Dr John Chaney immediately provided me a 
project and instant guidance at the time when it seemed that my scientific career ended or 
at least was seriously sidetracked. I am forever grateful to both of them. I would also like 
to express my sincere appreciation to Dr Jared Dempsey without whom this project could 
not have been realized. Not only that he provided me a place to run my study and a 
second home in form of the CNS Lab, but he also taught me the ropes of doing 
psychophysiological research what I will continue to do in the future. I would also like to 
thank Bill Lechner, David Lovett, Stephanie Klein and the other members of the CNS 
Lab for their assistance with various parts of this project. Finally, but not least, I would 
like to express how grateful I am to my parents for all their love and support throughout 
these years. 
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Chapter          Page 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................1 
 
  
II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE....................................................................................4 
  
 The mascot debate: A brief overview ......................................................................4 
 Implicit vs. explicit measures of attitudes................................................................5 
      Reaction-time implicit measures of attitudes ......................................................7 
           Reaction-time measures and Native Mascots ................................................8 
      Physiological implicit measures .......................................................................13 
           Autonomic measures ....................................................................................13 
                Affective modulation of the startle response (AMSR) ...........................14 
                Attitudes and the AMSR .........................................................................15 
 The current study ...................................................................................................18 
 
 
III. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................20 
 
 Participants .............................................................................................................20 
 Procedure and stimuli ............................................................................................20 
      Affective Modulation of the Startle Response ..................................................21 
      The Weapon Bias Task .....................................................................................23 
      Self-Assessment Manikin .................................................................................25 
vi 
 
Chapter          Page 
 
IV. FINDINGS .............................................................................................................26 
 
 Affective Modulation of the Startle Response .......................................................26 
 Self Assessment Manikin .......................................................................................28 
 Weapon Identification Task ...................................................................................28 
 AMSR and the Weapon Bias Task ........................................................................29 
 
 
V.  CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................31 
 
 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................38 
 
APPENDICES .............................................................................................................44
1 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 
MASCOTS OF FEAR 
Numerous Native American organizations asked for the discontinuation of the use of 
Native images and symbols in high school and college athletics. Their argument is that 
Native mascots caricaturize American Indians, and as such they contribute to the lower 
self-esteem, as well as lower academic achievement of Native students in the respective 
institutions. Although numerous educational institutions changed their Native mascots to 
non-Native ones, more than one-thousand high schools and close to hundred 
colleges/universities still oppose the change. Their argument is that these mascots do not 
intend to offend but instead they honor Native people and promote intercultural 
understanding by portraying American Indians in a positive way, depicting them as 
brave, skillful and strong warriors. The main counterargument of Native groups is that 
the sheer idea of “honoring” Native Americans raises them to an allegorical position 
(Robidoux, 2006, Chaney, 2008). 
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Changing a well-established mascot is undoubtedly a costly and risky marketing-
business. Nevertheless, a long line of research suggests that even perceived 
discrimination can be an environmental stressor, so in long run it might have adverse 
effects on members of the stigmatized group (Clark, Anderson, Clark & Williams, 1999). 
Second, keeping a mascot in face of appearing racist might seriously harm a team’s or an 
institution’s reputation. Consequently, the mascot issue does not only concern Native-
Americans, but it is a global marketing/management issue regarding how a school or a 
sport team wants to portray itself (Wolburg, 2006). 
So far, neither the opponents nor the supporters of the mascot-change have sufficient 
evidence to back up their arguments. The primary goal of the current study was to 
examine whether Native mascots are indeed perceived as more aversive than the 
Caucasian mascots are. Second, it also attempted to shed more light on the question what 
drives this effect. To investigate this, a psycho-physiological measure, the affective 
modulation of the startle response (AMSR) was used, along with a reaction-time measure 
(a modified version of the weapon-bias task). 
Humans respond with a startle response of their entire body (including eye-blink) to 
sudden stimuli of any sensory modality. The AMSR is a measure of affect that relies on 
the principle that this startle response is larger when people experience negative affect, 
such as threat, and it is smaller when they experience positive affect, such as interest 
(Bradley & Lang, 2007).  
Based on this principle it was hypothesized that if Native mascots are truly perceived 
negatively, the AMSR results will reveal that participants display larger startle responses 
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to Native mascots compared to the Caucasian mascots. Furthermore, it was also 
hypothesized that participants will react similarly to Native mascots as they do for well 
established negative pictorial stimuli and with larger startle response compared to 
established positive pictorial stimuli. It was also hypothesized that the driving-force 
behind this phenomenon is intergroup anxiety/fear (as captured by the modified version 
of the weapon bias task). 
The following chapters will provide a brief overview of the small, but slowly growing 
amount of evidence regarding the nature of these images. Along with the actual findings, 
a detailed overview and criticism of the methodological strengths and weaknesses of the 
measurement techniques these studies used will be provided. Finally, this current paper 
will argue for the superiority of the alternative, physiological method used and a 
comprehensive overview of the current study will be provided at the end. 
. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
The mascot debate: A brief overview 
Fryberg (2003) was among the first to find initial evidence that when exposed to 
stereotypical Native images (e.g. Pocahontas or Chief Wahoo), Native American students 
score lower on scales of self-esteem and future achievement-orientation. Conversely, 
when exposed to the same images, Caucasian students score higher on both scales. It 
appears that Native mascots might not only be degrading to Native Americans, but they 
also result in feelings of superiority among Caucasians. This could be one explanation 
why some supporters are opposing the idea of mascot change that fervently. 
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The primary source the opponents of the mascot-change usually cite is a large-scale 
survey conducted by Harris (2002) for the journal Sports Illustrated. Harris reported that 
the majority of the 351 Natives as well as the 743 Non-Natives he surveyed favored the 
Native mascots and did not express a wish to discontinue them. At the same time, the 
journal Indian Country Today reported that the majority of Native Americans whom they 
surveyed, favored the change of Native mascots and only the majority of Non-Native 
Americans supported the idea to keep the mascots (Chaney, 2008). The main problem 
with these and similar self-report measures is that people are reluctant to express their 
biased attitudes towards others. 
Implicit vs explicit measures of attitudes 
Attitudes are “mental and neural states of readiness, organized through experience, 
exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon an individual’s response to all objects and 
situations with which they are related” (Allport, 1935, p. 810). This early definition of 
attitudes captures the essence of how scholars think about this central concept of 
psychology and everyday life. More importantly, it aptly summarizes the basic theoretical 
idea, as well as the research methodology behind the current paper. 
An important feature of attitudes is that they are hypothetical constructs and cannot be 
observed directly, so we infer them based on peoples’ responses (Schwartz, 2008). 
Attitudes are also commonly described as operating at two different levels of awareness: 
one deliberate and conscious, while the other automatic and “unconscious” (Devos, 
2008).  
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Traditionally, researchers tapped only the conscious component, asking people how they 
felt about certain objects. Because of their overt nature, these measures are commonly 
referred to as “explicit” measures of attitudes. The biggest problem with these 
questionnaire-type measures is that they assume that people are consciously aware of 
their likes and dislikes and that they report them as they are. Schwartz (2008) describes 
three possible reasons why this might not always be the case. First, people might indeed 
have attitudes that are not consciously accessible for them at all. Second, people do not 
like to publicly reveal their inner feelings about others, especially if these feelings are not 
favorable. Finally, most people (like to) think about themselves as open-minded and 
egalitarian individuals; consequently, not acknowledging their biases against others 
makes people feel more comfortable.  
Dovidio (1997) was one of the first who reasoned that instead of asking for consciously 
formulated answers, a better way to measure inter-group-attitudes is by tapping into 
“unconscious” reactions. In the past decade several measures were developed for this 
purpose. These measures are commonly referred to as “implicit” measures, because they 
do not ask for an explicit attitude report, and because they can be detected even without 
participants’ explicit awareness (Schwarz, 2008). These implicit attitudes are commonly 
thought of as automatic processes (Devos, 2008), what means that they fall outside of 
conscious awareness; furthermore, they do not require control, intention and attention 
(Bargh, 1994).  
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Reaction-time measures of attitudes 
Most “implicit” measures are based on some type of a reaction time of the participants 
and they look either at facilitation effects or inhibition effects on the target of interest 
(Devos, 2008). Past research commonly used two types of implicit measures: sequential 
priming procedures as well as response competition procedures. 
The basic underlying idea of response competition procedures is that exposing 
participants to a stimulus that contains features implying different responses (e.g. both 
positive and negative features) will slow down the response. The most well known 
measure of this type is the “implicit association test” (IAT) that measures the speed 
people associate certain neutral stimuli (e.g. racial, ethnic or age-groups) with evaluative 
words (e.g. good or bad). Research on Native Mascots, so far has primarily relied on this 
research paradigm. 
The basic underlying idea of sequential priming procedures is that exposing participants 
to a certain stimulus will facilitate or inhibit their responses to subsequent related stimuli. 
The effect was found both in case of conceptually related stimuli (“concept priming”) as 
well as affectively related stimuli (“evaluative priming”). The Weapon Bias Task (Payne, 
2001), one of the measures used in the current paper, is a good example of measures of 
this type. In the original version of this task participants have to differentiate between 
weapons and tools (harmless objects). These objects are preceded by a face of either an 
African-American person or a Caucasian person flashed for a very short period of time. A 
consistent finding is that if participants can respond in their own pace, they react faster to 
guns in case of black faces compared to white faces. Furthermore, if participants are 
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forced to make snap judgments (respond within half-second), they more often misidentify 
a tool for a gun in case of black faces compared to white faces (Payne, 2006). Currently, 
it is unclear, what exactly is driving this effect. Is it the stereotypic association of 
African-Americans to aggression and danger or is this task simply tapping on a fear 
response driven by out-group-bias/anxiety?  
Reaction-time implicit measures and Native mascots 
Freng (2001) was the first to find initial evidence that certain Native mascots are indeed 
evaluated negatively. Specifically, he used a sequential priming procedure, subliminally 
exposing participants to a Native mascot (Chief Wahoo) or a Non-Native mascot 
(Yankees or Pirates). After this task, he presented participants letter-strings that were 
either meaningful (words) or meaningless. The words belonged to four distinct 
categories: positive Native-stereotypes, negative Native-stereotypes, baseball related 
words and control-words. The dependent variable was the speed participants categorized 
the presented letter strings as words or non-words. The striking finding was that 
participants responded faster to words classified as negative Native stereotypes than to 
words of the other three categories.  
This was the first empirical finding against the argument that Native mascots honor 
Native Americans. If this would be the case, participants should have identified the words 
classified as positive Native stereotypes faster than they identified the negative Native-
stereotypes. Nevertheless, this study does have some limitations. It is unclear whether the 
mascot activated only negative Native stereotypes (conceptual priming) or for some 
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unknown reason it evoked negative feelings and activated negative words in general 
(affective priming).  
Prejudice can be defined as a negative evaluation or attitude (Bodenhausen & Richeson, 
2010). In case of inter-group literature this negative out-group evaluative bias is often 
linked to and sometimes confused with stereotypes. While prejudice is a global 
evaluative reaction to others, a stereotype is simply a catalog of specific descriptions of 
characteristics of a certain group; these descriptive traits are often linked by causal, albeit 
not evaluative theories (Bodenhausen & Richeson, 2010). Recent theorizing (largely 
driven by modern neuro-scientific evidence) found clear evidence that these two concepts 
are independent from each other, linked to different brain regions, as well as they lead to 
different types of discriminatory responses.   
Consequently, without including words of negative valence that are unrelated to Native 
stereotypes, one cannot be sure where the effect actually lies. Additionally, Chief Wahoo, 
the grinning, red-faced mascot of Cleveland Indians, is one of the most caricaturistic 
Native-mascots. As this is arguably the most negative depiction of Native Americans 
among the athletic-logos, the effect could be related to this mascot only and might indeed 
evoke negative feelings of any kind.  
Avendano (2003) used the Implicit Association Test (IAT) to demonstrate that words 
describing Native nations (e.g. Navajo or Sioux) are more readily associated with 
negative evaluative words (e.g. rude, untrustworthy) than positive evaluative words (e.g. 
friendly, trustworthy). She also found that words describing European nations (e.g. Irish, 
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French) are more readily associated with positive evaluative words than negative 
evaluative words.  
Burke (2007) replicated Avendano’s study by replacing the words describing Native and 
European nations with the names of some Native mascots (e.g. Redskins) and Caucasian 
mascots (e.g. Celtics). If Native mascots are truly harmless, innocuous pictures that honor 
Native Americans, then there is no reason to expect that they will be more readily paired 
with negative words compared to positive words. However, Burke (2007) argues that this 
is what she found. Non-Native participants responded faster to “incompatible” pairings 
(Native-mascots + negative words and Caucasian-mascots + positive words) than to 
“compatible” pairings (Native-mascots + positive words and Caucasian-mascots + 
negative words). This is the strongest evidence so far that the already demonstrated 
negative evaluation of Native Americans might be activated solely by Native mascots and 
as such they are indeed perceived negatively.  
Nevertheless, Burke’s study has limitations. First, she also used only words that are both 
stereotypical, as well as negative. Therefore, it is unclear whether she indeed measured 
evaluations or just simply captured stereotypes (or some combination of the two). 
Second, even if she measured evaluations, she did not provide sufficient details about the 
reaction times of each condition. So, a possible alternative interpretation of her results 
cannot be ruled out. Consistent with the traditional IAT-scoring she combined the 
responses given to Native and Non-Native mascots. Consequently, the only finding she 
reported was that participants responded faster to “congruent” pairings (Caucasian-good, 
Native-bad) than to “incongruent” pairings (Caucasian-bad, Native-good). It is true that 
one possible interpretation of these results is that participants dislike Native American 
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mascots, so they more easily connect them to bad traits and have more difficulty 
connecting them to good traits. However, this would be a hasty conclusion based on these 
results. 
The same result might have happened also because participants have very strong positive 
implicit attitudes towards Caucasian mascots and a neutral or even a mildly positive 
implicit attitude towards Native-mascots. This would result in very fast reaction times for 
“congruent” pairings of Caucasian mascots and positive words, as well as very slow 
reaction times for “incongruent” pairings of Caucasian mascots and negative words. The 
described pattern of results alone could explain the observed effect, even if the attitudes 
towards the Native-mascots are also positive. Without more detailed reports we are 
unable to find out what exactly contributed to the effect Burke (2007) reported: in-group 
favoritism, out-group apprehension or both.  
Regardless of the discussed potential confounds, the convergence of the reported findings 
is impressive and definitively warrants further exploration. One way to shed more light 
on the mascot debate is to use different indirect measures and/or different research 
paradigms. This was the primary objective of the current study: replicating Burke’s 
findings using a physiological method that more clearly measures affective evaluation 
than the IAT does. The secondary aim was to shed more light on the driving force behind 
this effect. Are the Native mascots perceived more negatively compared to Caucasian 
mascots because of out-group anxiety that somehow became conditioned to these 
symbols? In other words, it was hypothesized that Native mascots are more readily 
associated with fear compared to the Caucasian mascots. 
12 
 
Before turning to the description of the current study, a general overview of physiological 
measures will be provided, with a special emphasis on how these measures were used in 
the study of in-group/out-group evaluative bias. 
 
 
Physiological implicit measures of attitudes 
Physiological measures are the most clearly “implicit” measures of attitudes by their 
nature. It is very unlikely that participants will realize that the physiological devices 
attached to them measure their attitudes. It is even less likely that they can purposefully 
influence their physiological reactions to the presented attitude relevant stimuli. 
Physiological reactions are involuntary and hard to control (Schwartz, 2008), which are 
two important features of implicit processes. Several studies also demonstrated that 
physiological reactions occur very quickly, directing behavior much earlier than people 
consciously become aware of why did they behave how they did (Ito & Cacioppo, 2007). 
A wide range of physiological measures was used so far under various research 
paradigms to study implicit attitudes. These measures range from costly and difficult 
brain imaging methods to the relatively inexpensive and easy to conduct autonomic 
response measures. As in the current study an autonomic measure was used, what follows 
is a brief overview of these measures only.  
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Autonomic measures 
The most frequently used autonomic measures are cardio-vascular and electro-dermal 
activity. Cardio-vascular activity is most often quantified by heart rate, blood pressure 
and heart-rate variability. Electro-dermal activity is most often quantified by skin 
conductance level. The popularity of these measures stems in their low cost and their ease 
of acquiration. Furthermore, they are sensitive to even very weak affective stimuli that 
are not detectable by other physiological measures; however, they also have limitations. 
Most notably, they are not sensitive to the valence of the attitudes, only their intensity. In 
other words, both positive and negative stimuli increase their activity (Ito & Cacioppo, 
2007). 
The two most commonly used measures that do provide information about the valence of 
stimuli are electromyography and startle eye-blink modification (Ito & Caccioppo, 2007). 
Subtle facial movements as recorded by facial electromyography reflect both the intensity 
and the valence of the attitude. However, people might potentially be able to consciously 
control their facial muscles (Ito & Cacioppo, 2007). Furthermore, even if the actual 
movements are purely automatic, the obtained measures might be confounded by facial 
movements that are completely unrelated to the evaluative reaction (Schwarz, 2008). For 
these reasons, a measure that is rapidly gaining popularity in many areas of psychology is 
the startle eye blink modification. This was the primary measure used in the current 
study. 
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Affective Modulation of the Startle Response (AMSR) 
Startle eye-blink is part of the whole body startle reflex, an automatic reaction to loud 
noises or other sudden and strong stimuli. The primary function of this reflex is 
protection from harm or injury (Bradley & Lang, 2007). Even though this reaction is 
automatic, it can be modified by other external (or internal) stimuli. Specifically, the 
startle response is facilitated if preceded by a negative stimulus and it is inhibited if 
preceded by a positive stimulus (Bradley & Lang, 2007). Although the affective stimuli 
modifying the startle response would not elicit startle by themselves, the modification 
effect happens most clearly in case of highly arousing stimuli, such as images of first 
person threat and erotica respectively. The described affective differentiation happens 
only if the interval between the stimulus and the startle probe (the noise) is of certain 
length, namely somewhere between 0.5 and 5 seconds (Bradley & Lang, 2007). 
According to Dempsey (2008), the best measures are achieved at intervals of 3-3.5 
seconds.  
Before turning to the description of the current study, a brief overview of the literature 
that examined the physiological underpinnings of (inter-group) attitudes will be provided. 
Although there is a vast literature on a wide range of physiological methods, the focus 
will be on startle modification, the method of choice for the current paper.  
Attitudes and Affective Modulation of the Startle Response (AMSR) 
The startle eye-blink modification is widely used as an index of the valence of stimuli. 
Despite of its popularity in wide range of areas in psychology (Dawson, Schell & 
Bohmelt, 1999), startle eye-blink modification was rarely the method of choice in attitude 
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research and not even other areas of social psychology. This is definitely puzzling given 
the fact that it is relatively inexpensive and easy to acquire and it is a fairly pure measure 
of the valence of the presented stimuli.  
Phelps and her colleagues (2000) were among the first to find evidence that startle eye-
blink modification is related to implicit race bias. They measured participants’ amygdala 
activity and their AMSR responses while participants viewed faces of unknown Black 
and White individuals. Phelps and her colleagues also measured their responses on the 
implicit association test (IAT), using the same Black and White faces. The researchers 
found that both of these implicit measures of attitudes correlated with amygdala activity. 
From this, Phelps (2000) concluded that amygdala activity is an index of the implicit 
racial bias.  
Amodio and his colleagues (2003) extended this research by looking at individual 
differences among low prejudiced individuals, measuring AMSR and motivation to 
respond without prejudice. They presented acoustic startle probes 4 seconds after they 
presented Black and White faces to their participants and also measured external and 
internal motivation to respond without prejudice. Participants did not differ in case of 
White faces. However, in case of Black faces, participants high in internal-, but low in 
external motivation to control prejudice displayed attenuated blinks than the other 
participants did (Amodio et al, 2003).  
Recently, Gyurák and Ayduk (2007) looked at defensive physiological reactions to 
rejection. They presented paintings depicting rejection and acceptance themes, as well as 
paintings about generally negative or positive themes unrelated to rejection, followed by 
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acoustic startle probes (on average 4.5 seconds). They found that in general, people 
displayed larger blinks for images depicting rejection compared to images depicting 
acceptance. More interestingly, however, they also measured self esteem and found that 
people with low self-esteem displayed larger blinks than people high in self-esteem in 
case of rejection images, but no difference was found in case of acceptance images.  
The results of Amodio (2003) and Gyurák (2007) suggest that AMSR is a good index of 
the evaluation of socially relevant stimuli, so it can be a very useful tool of social- and 
personality psychology. It appears that the method is especially effective in identifying 
intergroup biases, because it elegantly differentiates between positive, negative affective 
states. The AMSR corrects for all the problems inherent in IAT research: 1) it measures 
purely affect (without being confounded with stereotypes), 2) it can quantify evaluations 
of specific groups separately from each other and 3) it does have a zero point to which 
one can gauge the exact direction of the evaluation. 
Nevertheless, a limitation of the AMSR is that it cannot determine the exact emotion 
evoked by a certain stimulus, only its valence. Recent research by Amodio and Devine 
(2006) suggested that implicit evaluative bias (as measured by the IAT) was predictive of 
anxiety related behaviors (quantified for example as further seating distance). Another 
group of researchers found compelling evidence, that out-group faces are more readily 
conditioned to fearful stimuli and are more resistant to extinction than in-group faces 
(Olsson, Ebert, Banaji & Phelps, 2005). Out-groups (and especially racial out-groups) 
from an evolutionary standpoint are perceived as threatening ones physical safety, 
therefore evoking fear responses (Neuberg, Kenrick & Schaler, 2010). Based on 
evolutionary theorizing and the cited findings, it was hypothesized that the differential 
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evaluation of the two types of mascots could be driven by inter-group anxiety and be 
captured also as a differential fear response. 
 
The current study 
No study so far used the AMSR in order to demonstrate the existence of implicit bias 
toward Native American mascots (and not even Native Americans). This was the primary 
goal of the current study. The secondary goal was to explore the idea that the driving 
force behind this bias is an automatically activated fear response. 
Hypotheses 
Affective Modulation of the Startle Response (AMSR) 
It was predicted that AMSR will be significantly larger in the case of Native mascots 
compared to Caucasian mascots. It was also predicted that there will be significant startle 
amplification in the case of Native mascots compared to the positive images and a 
significant startle inhibition in the case of Caucasian mascots compared to the negative 
images. No difference was predicted in the case of Native mascots and negative images, 
as well as Caucasian mascots and positive images. Nevertheless, it was also hypothesized 
that both mascots will be in the neutral range too. 
Conscious rating of the experimental images 
 It was predicted that participants will rate positive, negative and neutral images 
according to their valence. It was further predicted based on the vast literature on 
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intergroup-bias that the ratings of Caucasian and Native mascots will not differ from each 
other and that both of them will be rated neutral to mildly positive. 
Weapon bias task 
It was predicted that guns will be identified faster than tools regardless of whether they 
are preceded by a Caucasian or a Native mascot. It was further predicted that guns will be 
identified faster if preceded by a Native mascot than if preceded by a Caucasian mascot. 
Conversely, it was also predicted that tools will be identified faster if preceded by a 
Caucasian mascot than if preceded by a Native mascot.
19 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Participants 
Twenty undergraduates (5 men, 15 women), from a South-Western University with a 
relatively high percentage of Native American students participated in the study. Their 
average age was 20 (range: 19-26) and 15 of them reported being Caucasian. All 
participants received course credit for their participation. Each participant was run in an 
individual session that lasted about 100 minutes. 
Procedure and Materials 
Upon arrival to the laboratory each participant received the consent form, informing that 
the study consists of three parts and it is concerned with reactions to different pictures. 
After signing the form, the participant was seated in a comfortable armchair in a small 
room, facing a computer screen placed on a distance of for four feet.  
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Affective Modulation of the Startle Response (AMSR) 
The experimenters first verified the intensity of the acoustic startle probe to be around 
105 dB, using a Radioshack Digital Sound Level Meter (model 33-2055). This was done 
to ensure safety of all participants and to maintain consistency throughout the study.  
Next, the experimenters attached surface EMG electrodes to a muscle below the 
participant’s eye (the orbicularis oculi). See Appendix (Figure 1) for graphical 
presentation of the electrode placement. The location of the placement of electrodes was 
chosen based on the recommendations of the Society for Psychophysiological research 
(Blumenthal, 2005). The site was first cleaned with an alcoholic wipe and then abraded 
with a Nuprep skin preparing gel (Weaver & Company, Aurora, CO). The surface 
electrodes (Ag-AgCl 4 mm, In Vivo Metric, E220-LS) were filled with Signa Gel 
electrode gel (Parker Laboratories, Fairfield, NJ) and placed on the prepared site. Finally, 
the experimenters verified that electrodes have a signal not higher than 10 kiloOhms 
(considered to be the best practice in AMSR research) using an impedance-meter (UFI 
Chectrode, model 1089mkIII, Morro Bay, CA). 
Before the start of the experimental session, a habituation phase was administered, where 
the participant received 10 startle probes while looking at a blank screen. The participant 
then proceeded to the pre-programmed experimental session, where the pictorial images 
were presented. All affective images were taken from the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS, Center for the Study of Emotion and Attention, 1995), meaning that they 
were standardized and commonly used in the startle modulation research paradigm 
before. The numbers in the next sentence refer to the specific numbers assigned to each 
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image in the IAPS image collection. Specifically 10 pleasant images, primarily erotica 
(1463, 2070, 4142, 4180, 4225, 4250, 4607, 4664, 4681, 7350), 10 unpleasant images 
depicting attacking animals and weapons pointing towards the camera (1050, 1120, 1300, 
1321, 1525, 1931, 6230, 6244, 6250, 6300) as well as 10 neutral images depicting 
common household objects (7010, 7030, 7041, 7050, 7052, 7055, 7056, 7175, 7217, 
7705) were shown. Each participant also watched images of 10 Native mascots (such as 
Braves or Fighting Sioux) and 10 Caucasian mascots (such as Vikings or Fighting Irish). 
See Appendix for the images of Caucasian and Native mascots. 
The altogether 50 images were presented in one of the five pre-programmed semi-random 
orders. In the case of each participant 80% of the time a 105 dB acoustic 50 ms long 
startle probe with instantaneous rise time (<1 ms) was presented, 3.5 to 4.5 seconds 
following the presentation of the image, through binaural headphones the participant was 
wearing (Sennheiser, model HD 202). The varying time-interval was used to control for 
expectancy effects. 
The raw electromyography (EMG) signal was collected via a BioPac V75-05 
Bioamplifier, and amplified 50.000-times. This signal was then full-wave rectified using 
a bandpass filter setting of 8-150 Hz and a time constant of 10 ms, on a BioPac V76-23 
contour-following integrator. Once acquired, these integrated signals were scored using 
the automated scoring procedure programmed in the BioPac Instruments Human Startle 
Software. Based on the guidelines of the Society for Psychophysiological Research, the 
startle response was calculated by taking the difference between the baseline (data 
immediately before the onset of the response) and the peak of that response within a 50 to 
200 ms window following the onset of the probe.  
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To eliminate the large individual differences in tonic levels of the startle response, 
following Blumenthal (2005) and Dempsey (2008) a z-score transformation was 
performed to standardize the data within each participant. Then, these z-score startle 
responses to each stimulus type (positive, negative, neutral, native and Caucasian) were 
averaged for each participant separately, arriving to 5 different individual average scores. 
The Weapon Bias Task 
After the picture viewing session the participant received a laptop computer in order to 
complete the modified weapon-bias task. The experimenter told the participant that the 
study is testing speed as well as accuracy of responding and that all the specific 
instructions will be displayed on the computer screen. The instructions were the 
following: “The next task measures speed and accuracy of responding under distracting 
conditions. You will see two pictures flashed quickly on screen, one after the other. The 
first picture will always be a sport mascot. Don’t do anything in response to the mascot. 
This mascot signals that the second picture is about to appear. Classify the second 
picture as either a gun or a tool, by pressing the key labeled as “gun” or “tool” 
respectively. Try to respond as quickly and accurately as you can. If you make a mistake, 
don’t worry. Just keep going to the next trial. You will have some practice trials before 
the main task begins. If you have any questions, please let the experimenter know.”    
The target stimuli consisted of five different images of guns, five different images of 
hand tools (originally used by Payne, 2006). Five images of Caucasian mascots and five 
images of Native mascots were used as primes.  
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After the participants read the instructions, the experimenter started the computerized 
program. To ensure that the participants understood the task, the experimenter stayed in 
the cubicle for the first two out of the ten practice trials and then quietly left. After the 
tenth practice trial the following text appeared on the screen: “You have now completed 
the practice trials. Press Space-bar to continue to the main task.”  
The main task consisted of sixty trials appearing in a computer generated randomized 
order in case of each participant. The first picture in each trial was always a mascot and 
remained on the screen for 200 ms-s and then replaced by the target that was always a 
gun or a tool. This second picture remained on the screen for 200 ms-s too and was then 
replaced with a visual mask image. The mask remained on the screen until the participant 
pressed a key on the keyboard. There was a 500 ms break between each response and the 
start of the next trial. 
At the end of the last, 60th trial the following text appeared on the screen: “You have 
successfully completed the task. Please, open the door to let the experimenter know that 
you are done.” 
Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) 
As a third measure, the participant proceeded to complete the Self-Assessment Manikin 
(SAM), a scale assessing ranking of all the pictures viewed on two separate scales of 
pleasure (unpleasant to pleasant) and arousal (dull to extremely arousing). The entire task 
was computerized and the participant was simply asked to click on the appropriate part of 
the 9-point rating scale for both dimensions (pleasure and arousal) separately, in case of 
each picture.  
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Given that the ratings were on the same scale and because there are no known individual 
differences, the scores were simply averaged across picture types in the case of each 
participant, arriving to 5 individual average scores for ratings of pleasure and arousal. 
Upon completion of all these measures, each participant was thoroughly debriefed, 
thanked and dismissed. 
Data Analysis. Planned t-tests were used to test the hypotheses described earlier. When 
testing apriori hypotheses, no alpha corrections were used. When testing exploratory, 
non-planned hypotheses, alpha was corrected using the modified Bonferoni correction 
(Keppel, 1991). 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
When controlled for multiple outliers, the results remained significant and the pattern of 
results also remained the same, with an even more clear distinction between positive and 
negative images. Therefore, in the following these, improved results are reported, what 
means that two participants (multiple outliers) were excluded from the analysis. 
Affective Modulation of the Startle Response (AMSR) 
To analyze the Affect Modulated Startle Reflex (AMSR) results, a within-subject 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted, followed by a series of simple paired t-
tests. The results yielded a significant effect of picture type, F(4, 68) = 8.77, p = 0.001, 
η2 = 0.34.. 
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The planned, simple t-tests revealed that most of the original findings of startle reflex 
modulation were replicated. Specifically, startle reflex responses were significantly larger 
for negative images compared to positive images (M = 0.17, SD = 0.24 vs. M = - 0.36, 
SD = 0.23), t = - 6.39, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.706. Also, in case of positive images, the 
traditional approach-related startle reflex inhibition was observed: startle reflex responses 
were significantly smaller for positive images compared to neutral images (M=-0.16, 
SD=0.28), t = 3.477, p = 0.03, η2 = 0.416. However, in case of negative images, there was 
no evidence for the avoidance-related startle reflex attenuation: startle reflex responses 
showed only a marginally significant difference for negative images compared to neutral 
images, t = 4.215, p = 0.056, η2 = 0,199. The exact same pattern of results was observed 
by other researchers as well (e.g. Amodio, 2003). 
The results also supported the a priori hypotheses that Native mascots will be viewed 
more negatively than Caucasian mascots. On average, startle reflex responses were 
significantly larger for the images of Native American mascots compared to the images 
of Caucasian mascots (M = 0.009, SD = 0.37 vs. M = - 0.17, SD = 0.29), t = - 3.19, p = 
0.005, η2 = 0.375. Furthermore, startle reflex responses were also significantly larger for 
the images of Native American mascots compared to the positive images (t = 3.77, p = 
0.002, η2 = 0.46). Additionally, startle reflexes were significantly smaller for the images 
of Caucasian mascots compared to the negative images (t = - 3.95, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.48). 
Finally, as expected, startle response reactions to both types of mascots were similar to 
responses to neutral images (t = 0.870, p = 0.40, η2 = 0.043 and t = - 1.37, p = 0.19, η2 = 
0.100 respectively). See Table 1 for detailed summary of the results. 
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Self Assessment Manikin (SAM) 
A within-subject analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted using rating of affect as 
dependent variable, followed by simple t tests. The results, again, yielded a significant 
effect of picture type, F(4,68) = 28.33, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.625. Specifically, the typical 
ratings of affective images using the SAM scale were replicated: negative images were 
rated as more aversive than the neutral and the positive images (2.89 vs. 4.81 vs. 5.32, t = 
- 6.26, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.70 and t = 5.96, p < 0.001, η2  = 0.68 respectively). Furthermore, 
positive images were rated as more pleasant than the neutral images (t = 1.76, p < 0.001, 
η2 = 0.15). As predicted, there was also no difference in affective ratings of the two types 
of mascots (5.06 vs. 5.16, t = - 1.31, p = 0.41, η2 = 0.09). Exploratory analyses further 
revealed that both Caucasian and Native mascots were rated as significantly more 
pleasant than negative images (t = 7.279 p < 0.001, η2 = 0.76 and t = 9.583, p < 0.001, η2 
= 0.84 respectively). See Table 2 for detailed summary of the results. 
Weapon Identification Task 
Error rates 
As expected based on previous research using the same research paradigm (e.g. Payne, 
2001) the number of errors was very small in general and the analysis yielded no 
significant results when comparing the two types of mascots. If anything, participants 
made fewer errors when the picture was preceded by Native mascots; however this result 
was not significant. (See Table 3 for detailed results.)  
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Reaction times 
Only the reaction times of correct responses falling within two standard deviations 
(latencies between 200 and 900 ms-s) were included in the analysis. The results 
replicated previous findings that guns were identified more quickly than tools regardless 
of the stimulus that preceded them. Specifically, participants were faster to identify guns 
than tools when they followed Caucasian mascots (305 ms vs. 355 ms, t = 6.03, p < 
0.001, η2  = 0.71). Participants were also faster to identify guns than tools when they 
followed Native mascots (292.84 ms vs. 352.37 ms, t = 7.18, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.77). The 
results also found support for the expected race bias. Specifically, participants were 
somewhat faster to identify guns when they followed Native mascots compared to when 
they followed Caucasian mascots (t = 2.283, p = 0.037, η2  = 0.26). However, participants 
did not differ in the speed of identification of tools in case of the two mascot-types (t = 
0.385, p = 0.545, η2  = 0.010). See Table 3 for detailed summary of the results. 
AMSR and the Weapon Bias 
The results revealed that individuals show an evaluative bias both at physiological level 
(AMSR) as well as implicit cognitive level (weapon bias). One possibility is that the 
physiological implicit bias is driven by inter-group anxiety (that the weapon-bias is 
tapping on). To investigate this idea, two different bias scores were calculated and 
regressed on each other. First, a Physiological Bias score was calculated by subtracting 
the AMSR score for Caucasian mascots from the AMSR score for Native mascots. 
Theoretically, individuals who show a larger eye-blink to Native mascots compared to 
the Caucasian mascots, feel more negatively about the Native mascots. Second, a Fear 
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Bias was calculated by subtracting the gun reaction times for Native mascots from the 
gun reaction times for Caucasian mascots. Higher scores on both of these measures 
suggest higher bias and anxiety response respectively. 
To test the hypothesis that intergroup anxiety is the driving force behind the observed 
difference in AMSR, the calculated Fear Bias scores were regressed on the calculated 
AMSR bias scores. The results revealed that the Fear Bias scores did not significantly 
predict the AMSR Bias scores, β = -0.039, t(17) = -0.158, p = 0.876. The Fear Bias 
scores explained only a small proportion of variance in the AMSR Bias scores, r
2
 = 
0.002, F(1, 17) = 0.025, p = 0.876. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
Prejudice and negative discrimination of others based on their belonging to a certain 
group is a controversial issue that is treated with utmost delicacy in the contemporary 
western world and especially in the United States. Theoretically, we should object every 
kind of discrimination, defined as “differential treatment of individuals” (Bodenhausen & 
Devine, 2010), and most Americans are indeed rather successful in it. For this reason it is 
surprising how lightheartedly the issue of Native American mascots was treated in the 
past, even though several Native American organizations raised their voice that they find 
these mascots offensive and that they would wish if they are discontinued. The supporters 
of the mascots are basing their argument on one large-scale survey published in a non-
academic journal (Sports Illustrated) revealing very little about its methodology, simply 
stating that people, in general, favor Native mascots. A big problem with survey-type 
studies is that people are unlikely to reveal their true attitudes (or often times they are 
even unaware of them), especially if these attitudes are negative evaluations of members 
of other groups. 
31 
 
Recently, few studies attempted to tap on people’s “unconscious” (implicit/automatic) 
reactions to Native mascots and although the results are promising, these studies still 
suffer from shortcomings. Burke (2007, 2010), used the Implicit Association Test and 
found evidence that just like Native Americans are perceived more negatively than 
Caucasian Americans are, Native mascots too are perceived more negatively than 
Caucasian mascots are. However, one problem with Burke’s studies (2007, 2010) is that 
it is not exactly clear if her participants really perceived the Native mascots negatively or 
they simply had very strong positive associations with the Caucasian mascots – a 
problem inherent in every IAT study. The second problem is, that Burke (2007, 2010) 
confounded evaluations with stereotypes, so it is not exactly clear  whether the 
associations her participants made in case of Native mascots were negative evaluations 
(often referred as “prejudice”) or simply “stereotypical” associations.  
In the current study an implicit measure was used that eliminates these two major 
problems: 1) it clearly measures evaluation (affect) and not stereotypes (cognition), and 
2) it makes exactly clear the specific valence of the participants’ evaluative responses in 
case of each type of mascot separately (and not just relatively). Specifically, the Affective 
Modulation of the Startle Response was used, a procedure considered to be a direct 
measure of affect via the measurement of changes in participants’ eye-blink responses. 
The main goal was to gauge the affective valence of the reaction that these two types of 
mascots elicit in individuals. Theoretically, all mascots are designed to be intimidating, 
so there should be no difference in the valence of the effect evoked by Caucasian and 
Native American mascots.  
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When asked for their conscious evaluations of these images, on average, participants 
stated that they felt equally positively about the Caucasian and Native mascots. This 
supports the findings reported in Sports Illustrated. Nevertheless, looking at the 
physiological responses of same participants, just as expected, the evaluations were 
completely different. On average, participants reacted to Native mascots more negatively 
than they reacted to the Caucasian mascots. Furthermore, their affective responses to 
Native mascots resembled their responses to negative images (threat) but differed from 
their responses to positive images (erotica). Conversely, their affective responses to 
Caucasian mascots resembled their responses to the positive images (erotica) but differed 
from their responses to the negative images (threat). This provides clear evidence that 
Native mascots are indeed perceived negatively, while Caucasian mascots are perceived 
positively, so it rules out one of the biggest potential criticisms of Burke’s findings (2007, 
2010) that her results might be simply explained by very positive evaluation of Caucasian 
mascots.  
Nevertheless, it should be stated that although the AMSR is a pure measure of valence 
(without any confound with stereotypes), it cannot differentiate between specific 
emotions on either side of the spectrum. One criticism of the IAT results regarding 
Native mascots was that even if there are negative evaluations involved, the associations 
of the negative stereotypical words with Native mascots could have happened because of 
egalitarian attitudes (a genuine sorry & guilt  about the tragedy of Native Americans) 
rather than hatred. Although, it is true that the AMSR can tap only a general affective 
reaction, based on the results of the current study it would be a stretch to say that 
egalitarian attitudes (such as pity) are responsible for the results. Participants not only 
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showed a negative physiological response towards Native mascots, but their responses 
were indistinguishable from their responses to threat/personal harm negative images. 
Nevertheless, exactly because the AMSR provides only information about affective 
valence, it was important to start exploring the potential driving force behind this 
differential reaction to Native- and Caucasian mascots.  
Based on evolutionary theory, as well as recent implicit bias research (Amodio & Devine, 
2006; Olsson, Ebert, Banaji & Phelps, 2005), it was hypothesized that Native mascots are 
more readily associated with fear/anxiety than Caucasian mascots are. To explore this 
idea, a modified version of the weapon bias task (Payne, 2001, 2006) was used, replacing 
the African-American and Caucasian face primes with the Native and Caucasian mascots. 
The results supported the hypothesis, showing that participants responded faster to guns 
than tools, especially if they were preceded by Native mascots compared to if they were 
preceded by Caucasian mascots. This provides preliminary evidence that the Native 
mascots might be perceived more negatively, because they are anxiety provoking.  
So far, there is no evidence that an innocuous drawing, a symbolic representation of a 
group can evoke such strong reactions that are comparable to the reactions of the actual 
out-group. It is not exactly clear what the weapon bias task measures. However, it would 
be difficult to explain the AMSR results anyhow else, but reflecting genuine negative 
evaluations of the Native mascots, a reflex that cannot be controlled even if one is 
completely familiar with the theory (Dempsey, 2010). The convergence of the results in 
the current paper with each other, as well as with previous findings (e.g. Burke, 2007, 
2010) strongly suggests that individuals are indeed reacting to mascots just like they are 
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real out-group members. If this is true, based on evolutionary theory, it might have larger, 
societal implications that should not be ignored by policy makers.  
First, mascots might act as environmental primes that place people into a state of 
preparedness to threat, intensifying the effects of already existing out-group bias. In other 
words, it is possible that when exposed to Native mascots (e.g. attending an institution 
with a Native mascot), individuals become more rejecting and hostile towards out-group 
members (regardless of the type of the out-group: racial, ethnic, sexual orientation etc).  
Second, evolutionary theory suggests and research indeed found preliminary support that 
males are especially inclined to evaluate negatively out-group members and they are also 
more likely to react in a more hostile way towards them (Navarette, Olsson, Ho, Mendes, 
Thomsen & Sidanius, 2009). Given the small number of males in current study, this 
hypothesis could not be investigated directly. Nevertheless, as males are especially likely 
to be exposed to mascots given their higher involvement in spectator sports at colleges, 
this potential gender difference might be important issue to consider. 
Third, our analysis revealed that individuals were both more likely to perceive Native 
mascots as more aversive and more threatening than Caucasian mascots, however, these 
two measures were unrelated to each other. In other words individuals who perceived the 
mascots the most aversive were not the same who perceived them as the most 
threatening. This might suggest that although threat is part of the negative evaluative 
response to these images, it is not the only or maybe not even the most important 
component. Future studies should investigate the role of other possible specific aversive 
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emotions; such is, for example, disgust and the related behavioral response of physical 
distance.  
Finally, it should be noted that although evolutionary explanations gained immense 
popularity in contemporary social psychology, they are not the only (and possibly not 
even the best) way to explain psychological phenomena. An equally plausible 
explanation for the observed evaluative bias to Native compared to Caucasian mascots 
can be given by learning theory as well. Such an environmental account might say that 
the observed difference could be predicted simply by looking at the portrayal of Native 
Americans in movies and printed media that an average American might encounter on a 
daily basis since early age. Westerns are a popular entertainment for children and in these 
movies Native Americans are most of the time portrayed as aggressive almost subhuman 
groups that pose threat and danger to the cowboys. In the same line, if a media features 
any information about Native Americans, it is usually, again, a negative depiction: 
bringing attention to the higher incidence rate of drug abuse and alcoholism, as well as 
unemployment and low level of education among Native Americans. All this negative 
information becomes associated to Native Americans from early on in most individuals 
lives and without being counteracted with other positive information, only becomes 
reinforced throughout the lifespan. 
All these potential implications and considerations are worthy of further investigation 
with more directly experimental designs and/or different operational definitions of the 
constructs. However, even with its limitations to fully explain the driving force behind 
the negative evaluation of Native mascots, the current research is an important addition to 
the research on Native mascots, as well as to the research on intergroup bias in general. 
36 
 
This is the first demonstration that innocent and seemingly positive images, if somehow 
conditioned to a minority group, can evoke negative emotions in the observers and 
specifically they might even lead to the experience of threat. Based on evolutionary and 
behaviorist theory, it can be assumed that if activated, such feelings might have adverse 
effects not only on reactions to Native American individuals but on behaviors directed 
towards any out-group in general. Given this potential global negative impact of Native 
mascots, especially within institutions where they are used, it is time to pay more heed to 
them than relegating the issue to the pages of Sports Illustrated.
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APPENDICES 
 
Table 1. 
AMSR.  
 Positive Caucasian Neutral Native Negative 
Mean – all 
w/o outliers 
- 0.28 
- 0.358 
- 0.166 
- 0.166 
- 0.006 
- 0.016 
+ 0.105 
+ 0.091 
+ 0.106 
+ 0.168 
St. Deviation 
(w/o outliers) 
0.232 0.296 0.283 0.370 0.238 
. 
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Table 2. 
SAM – Valence. 
 Positive Native Caucasian Neutral Negative 
Mean  5.317 5.183 5.017 4.806 2.894 
St. Deviation 1.272 0.677 0.469 0.532 1.284 
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Table 3. 
Weapon-bias task. 
 Errors – Mean (SD) Reaction time – Mean (SD) 
Native - Gun 2.263 (1.694) 292.837 (35.662) 
Caucasian  - Gun 2.158 (1.642) 305.510 (37.108) 
Native - Tool 2.842 (2.500) 352.373 (42.690) 
Caucasian - Tool 3.263 (2.663) 355.882 (47.013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 1. 
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Placement of AMSR electrodes 
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